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Before:  AMBRO, FISHER and GARTH, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Filed: November 23, 2010) 
____________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
____________ 
 
FISHER, Circuit Judge. 
 Appellant David Matusiewicz pled guilty to one count of bank fraud, in violation 
of 18 U.S.C. § 1344, and one count of international parental kidnapping, in violation of 
18 U.S.C. § 1204.  Matusiewicz argues that the District Court erred in imposing 




a vulnerable victim, and an abuse of a position of private trust, all of which increased his 
total offense level.  For the reasons stated below, we will affirm. 
I. 
 We write exclusively for the parties, who are familiar with the factual context and 
legal history of this case.  Therefore, we will set forth only those facts necessary to our 
analysis. 
 Matusiewicz is a father of three daughters and is divorced from their mother, 
Christine Belford.  Prior to the divorce, Matusiewicz and his family lived at a home on 
Norva Drive (the “Norva Drive Property”) in Delaware.  Following the divorce, Belford 
moved out, and Matusiewicz lived at the Norva Drive Property with his children pursuant 
to an interim custody order of the Delaware Family Court.  The custody arrangement 
provided that Matusiewicz and Belford would share joint custody. 
 On August 15, 2007, Matusiewicz forged Belford‟s signature to obtain a $249,000 
home equity loan from Wilmington Savings Fund Society (“WSFS”) secured by the 
Norva Drive Property.  On August 21, 2007, the proceeds from the loan were transferred 
into Matusiewicz‟s WSFS checking account.  Thereafter, the majority of the funds were 
wire transferred to an account in the Bank of New Zealand that Matusiewicz opened 
using the name “Thomas Matusiewicz.”  The government contacted the entity that 




 On August 26, 2007, Matusiewicz kidnapped his three daughters, L.M.1, L.M.2, 
and K.M., ages 5, 4, and 2 at the time.
1
  L.M.2 has autism.  Matusiewicz left Delaware in 
a motor home, telling Belford that he was taking the children on a vacation.  Instead, 
Matusiewicz left the country, drove through Central America, and eventually settled in 
Nicaragua.  Law enforcement located Matusiewicz and his daughters over nineteen 
months later.  Meanwhile, WSFS sold the Norva Drive Property when $129,707 was 




 On September 3, 2009, Matusiewicz pled guilty in the United States District Court 
for the District of Delaware to bank fraud and international parental kidnapping.  The 
probation office prepared a Presentence Investigation Report (“PSR”), recommending 
seven enhancements to the base offense level.  The District Court imposed these 
enhancements and sentenced Matusiewicz to forty-eight months‟ imprisonment for the 
bank fraud charge and thirty-six months‟ imprisonment for the international parental 
kidnapping charge, to be served concurrently.  Matusiewicz filed a timely notice of 
appeal. 
                                                 
1
 Matusiewicz‟s daughters are referred herein by their initials only. 
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 The District Court had subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3231.  
We have appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a). 
 In evaluating whether a district court erred in determining the applicable 
Sentencing Guidelines range, we “review factual findings relevant to the Guidelines for 
clear error and [] exercise plenary review over a district court‟s interpretation of the 
Guidelines.”  United States v. Grier, 475 F.3d 556, 570 (3d Cir. 2007) (en banc).  We 
review for plain error when a defendant does not timely object to a district court‟s 
determination of the applicable Guidelines range.  See Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b); see also 
United States v. Hart, 273 F.3d 363, 375 (3d Cir. 2001). 
III. 
 On appeal, Matusiewicz contends that the District Court erred in imposing four of 
the seven enhancements.  First, he argues that the District Court improperly calculated 
the loss to WSFS and improperly included legal fees incurred under U.S.S.G. § 
2B1.1(b)(1).  Second, he challenges the District Court‟s imposition of the “sophisticated 
means” enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2B.1(b)(9)(C).  Third, Matusiewicz asserts that 
the District Court erred in finding that a “vulnerable victim” enhancement was proper 
under U.S.S.G. § 3A1.1(b)(1).  Finally, he disputes the applicability of the enhancement 
for “abuse of a position of trust” pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3B1.3.  We address each 




A.  Amount of Loss 
 Matusiewicz advances three arguments as to why the amount of loss was 
calculated incorrectly for purposes of U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(1).  First, he asserts that the 
District Court erred in computing the amount WSFS recovered from the sale of the Norva 
Drive Property.  Second, he argues that the District Court used an incorrect value for 
expenses incurred by WSFS in selling the Norva Drive Property.  Third, he asserts that 
the District Court erred in finding that legal fees may be deducted from the amount 
WSFS recovered. 
 In his formal objections to the PSR, Matusiewicz argued that WSFS experienced a 
“zero loss” fraud because the $249,000 was returned.  Because Matusiewicz did not 
object to the calculation of the individual items of loss before the District Court, we 
review for plain error.  See Hart, 273 F.3d at 375.  Matusiewicz maintains that the 
District Court should have calculated the amount WSFS recovered based on the balance 
of $123,062 owed on the property prior to the fraud, rather than the amount owed at the 
time of the sale.  Under the Guidelines, loss is reduced by “the amount the victim has 
recovered at the time of sentencing from disposition of the collateral.”  U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1 
cmt. n.3(E)(ii).  The balance owed at the time of the fraud in August 2007 is not the 
relevant value.  Rather, the pertinent amount is $129,707 – the balance owed on the 
mortgage when WSFS sold the Norva Drive Property.  To obtain the amount WSFS 
recovered, the balance remaining at the time of the sale was subtracted from the sale 
price.  Matusiewicz did not object to this calculation and “[a] conclusion in the 




a proper basis for sentence determination.”  United States v. McDowell, 888 F.2d 285, 
290 n.1 (3d Cir. 1989).  Therefore, the District Court did not commit an error, let alone a 
plain error, in this regard. 
 Matusiewicz‟s argument as to the calculation of legal fees incurred by WSFS fails 
for the same reason.  He contends that the District Court should not have relied on the 
finding in the PSR that WSFS incurred $33,999 in expenses, but rather should have 
considered the Delaware Family Court‟s expense estimate.  Because Matusiewicz did not 
previously raise this argument, the District Court‟s reliance on the PSR was an 
appropriate factual finding and did not constitute plain error.  See id.; see also United 
States v. Watson, 482 F.3d 269, 274 (3d Cir. 2007). 
 Finally, Matusiewicz asserts that the District Court erred by subtracting legal fees 
that WSFS incurred in selling the Norva Drive Property because the court may consider 
“[t]he cost of repairs to damaged property” in estimating the loss, but the application note 
makes no mention of legal fees.  U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1 cmt. n.3(C).  This argument is not 
persuasive.  The application note‟s list of factors that a district court should consider is 
non-exhaustive.  See id.  Moreover, litigation expenses incurred to secure the disposition 
of collateralized property may be subtracted from the sale price in determining the 
amount recovered.  See United States v. Sharma, 190 F.3d 220, 229 (3d Cir. 2009).  Here, 
the legal fees that WSFS paid were additional expenses incurred to sell the property 
following Matusiewicz‟s fraud.  Therefore, the District Court did not commit plain error 
in finding that these fees should be subtracted from the amount WSFS recovered.  See 




B.  Sophisticated Means 
 Second, Matusiewicz claims that the District Court erred in imposing the 
enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(9)(c) because forging his ex-wife‟s signature to 
obtain a loan and transferring the money abroad does not rise to the level of 
“sophisticated means.”  Additionally, Matusiewicz notes that the government was able to 
recover the money easily.  We exercise plenary review over the District Court‟s analysis 
of the Guidelines and apply clear error review to factual findings.  See Grier, 475 F.3d at 
570. 
 “„[S]ophisticated means‟ means especially complex or especially intricate offense 
conduct pertaining to the execution or concealment of an offense.”  U.S.S.G. 
§ 2B1.1(b)(9)(C) cmt. n.8(B).  To that end, “[c]onduct such as hiding assets or 
transactions, or both, through the use of . . . offshore financial accounts also ordinarily 
indicates sophisticated means.”  Id.  The District Court found that Matusiewicz used a 
fictitious name to gain access to a foreign account in the Bank of New Zealand, thereby 
further concealing his fraud.  In addition, the District Court noted that the government 
expended significant time and resources to uncover the fraud.  The District Court did not 
err in comparing the facts to an example explicitly mentioned in the application note.  See 
Grier, 475 F.3d at 570.  In addition, the fact that the government was eventually able to 
discover the fraud does not render Matusiewicz‟s actions any less sophisticated.  See 
United States v. Wayland, 549 F.3d 526, 529 (7th Cir. 2008).  Therefore, Matusiewicz‟s 




C.  Vulnerable Victim 
 Next, Matusiewicz claims that the enhancement for “vulnerable victim” under 
U.S.S.G. § 3A1.1(b)(1) was unwarranted for two reasons.  First, Matusiewicz maintains 
that the application of the enhancement due to his children‟s age resulted in 
impermissible double counting given that the international parental kidnapping statute 
includes as an element that the child be a minor.  Before the District Court, Matusiewicz 
did not raise this double counting argument.  As such, we review for plain error.  See 
Watson, 482 F.3d at 274.  Second, Matusiewicz insists that the District Court did not 
make sufficient factual findings to justify imposing this enhancement. 
A “„vulnerable victim‟ means a person (A) who is a victim of the offense of 
conviction and any conduct for which the defendant is accountable . . . and (B) who is 
unusually vulnerable due to age, physical or mental condition, or who is otherwise 
particularly susceptible to the criminal conduct.”  U.S.S.G. § 3A1.1(b)(1) cmt. n.2.  This 
enhancement is not applicable, however, “if the factor that makes the person a vulnerable 
victim is incorporated in the offense guideline.”  Id. (emphasis added).  The District Court 
found that Matusiewicz‟s children were vulnerable victims due to their young age and the 
fact that L.M.2 is autistic.  Neither of these factors – age or mental condition – are 
incorporated into the applicable offense guideline, U.S.S.G. § 2J1.2(a). 
 “[T]he Guidelines explicitly note when double counting is forbidden.”  United 
States v. Fisher, 502 F.3d 293, 309 (3d Cir. 2007) (internal citation omitted).  The 
enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 3A1.1(b)(1) is improper only when the relevant factor is 




accounted for in the international parental kidnapping statute is, therefore, irrelevant.  See 
id.  Thus, the District Court did not err in this regard. 
 As to Matusiewicz‟s second contention, he argues that the District Court‟s factual 
findings do not justify a vulnerable victim enhancement.  He asserts that the District 
Court imposed the enhancement solely on the basis of the familial bonds between him 
and his daughters.  This “enhancement may be applied where:  (1) the victim was 
particularly susceptible or vulnerable to the criminal conduct; (2) the defendant knew or 
should have known of this susceptibility or vulnerability; and (3) this vulnerability or 
susceptibility facilitated the defendant‟s crime in some manner.”  United States v. Zats, 
298 F.3d 182, 186 (3d Cir. 2002). 
 The District Court properly applied the enhancement in this case.  First, the 
District Court found that all of Matusiewicz‟s children were five years old or under 
during the kidnapping.  Further, L.M.2 was also dealing with the challenges of autism.  
Second, Matusiewicz was aware of their vulnerability.  Third, the District Court 
determined that the ages and mental condition of the children facilitated Matusiewicz‟s 
ability to commit the crime because their vulnerability prevented them from seeking help.  
The findings of the District Court were sufficient to justify the enhancement based on the 
age and mental condition of the children – factors that are specifically mentioned in the 
application note. 
D.  Abuse of a Position of Private Trust 
 Finally, Matusiewicz disputes the application of the enhancement for an abuse of a 




Court applied this enhancement solely because he abused his position of trust as the 
parent of minor children.  Consequently, Matusiewicz argues that this position of trust is 
a specific offense characteristic of the international parental kidnapping statute and may 
not form the basis of an enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.3.  Second, Matusiewicz 
claims that the enhancement for an abuse of a position of private trust is inapplicable to 
familial relationships.  Because these arguments implicate the District Court‟s 
interpretation of the Guidelines, our review is plenary.  See Grier, 475 F.3d at 570. 
 At the outset, it is critical to note that the District Court‟s application of the 
enhancement was not based on the familial relationship between Matusiewicz and his 
children alone.  Rather, the District Court found an abuse of a position of private trust as 
a result of Matusiewicz‟s status as a custodial parent pursuant to the order of the 
Delaware Family Court.  In that capacity, as the District Court pointed out, “there 
necessarily must be some level of trust between the parents, at a very minimum, that they 
will adhere to the Family Court‟s orders and be forthright with one another regarding 
important decisions in the life and care of their children.”  (App. 38.) 
 Turning back to Matusiewicz‟s first argument, this position of private trust – as a 
parent given legal joint custody pursuant to a court order – is not a specific offense 
characteristic of the international parental kidnapping statute and may properly form the 
basis of the enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.3. 
 As to his second argument, Matusiewicz claims that an abuse of a position of 
private trust includes only business or professional relationships.  “„Public or private 




managerial discretion . . . .”  U.S.S.G. § 3B1.3 cmt. n.1.  In United States v. Pardo, we 
held that “we are unwilling to draw a bright line limiting the abuse of trust increase to the 
employment relationship.”  25 F.3d 1187, 1190-91 (3d Cir. 1994).  To determine whether 
a position constitutes a position of trust, we consider “(1) whether the position allows the 
defendant to commit a difficult-to-detect wrong; (2) the degree of authority which the 
position vests in defendant vis-à-vis the object of the wrongful act; and (3) whether there 
has been reliance on the integrity of the person occupying the position.”  Id. at 1192.  
Reaffirming Pardo, we have determined that a defendant‟s use of his position in his 
church where he acted as a teacher, advisor, and counselor to defraud parishioners 
constituted an abuse of a position of private trust.  See United States v. Dullum, 560 F.3d 
133, 140 (3d Cir. 2009). 
 Applying the Pardo factors here, all three are satisfied.  First, Matusiewicz‟s 
position as a custodial parent facilitated the kidnapping because he obtained control of 
the children from Belford under the pretext of taking them on a vacation.  Had the 
Delaware Family Court not granted Matusiewicz partial custody, it would have been 
more difficult for him to kidnap the children undetected.  Second, at the time of the 
kidnapping, the Delaware Family Court‟s order allowed him to exercise this control over 
the children.  Third, there was adequate reliance on Matusiewicz‟s position as custodial 
parent because Belford and the Delaware Family Court trusted that he would comply 
with the court‟s orders.  The District Court‟s factual findings were not clearly erroneous 
and its conclusion that Matusiewicz abused his position of trust as a custodial parent was 





 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the sentence of the District Court. 
